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For providing a theoretical foundation for our methodological framework for evaluating 
water institutions and sector performance, we develop an alternative theory of institutional 
change that explicitly recognizes individuals as the source of change by tracing the linkages 
between their subjective perception and institutional change.  Such an alternative theory of 
institutional change where the main motive force is the changes in the subjective perception 
of individuals is nothing radical as it remains only a refinement and restatement of the ideas 
present in existing literature.  In fact, the critical role that subjective factors play in the 
process of institutional change is underlined by institutional economists of all schools and 
traditions (e.g., Veblen, 1919; Commons, 1934; Bhaskar, 1979; Douglas, 1986; North, 1990 
and 1997; Hodgson, 1998).  But, there is neither any systematic theory to explain the roles of 
these subjective factors in the process of institutional change nor any approach for their 
analytical incorporation within an evaluation framework amenable for empirical analysis.   
For a better articulation of our alternative theory of institutional change, it is necessary to 
understand well the meaning and role of subjective perception as found in the literature. 
2. SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
While the subjective perception idea is closely linked to the subjective nature of institutions, 
the emphasis here is on the mechanisms with which it affects the process of institutional 
evaluation and change.  As noted already, North (1990: 17) has represented subjective 
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perception in terms of his ideas of “mental construct” and “subjective model”.   
Understandably, these ideas are closely related to the notion of “prevailing habits of 
thought” (Veblen, 1919: 239) as well as the idea of “habitual assumptions” (Commons, 1934: 
69).  Notably, Commons (1934: 654) links ideology, habitual assumptions, and knowledge 
within a single process as he views ideological evolution as a process of modifications in 
“habitual assumptions” brought about by experimental problem solving by individuals, 
organizations, courts, and governments.  However, it is North (1990), who has explicitly 
recognized the important roles that the ‘mental construct’ or the ‘subjective model’ of 
individuals plays in the process of institutional change. According to him, subjective 
perception plays a powerful role in institutional choice and change, especially when formal 
institutions make it possible for individuals to express preferences at little cost to 
themselves.1 
  Interestingly, Bromley (1989) assigns an important role to ‘collective attitude’ as a 
source of institutional change.  The attitudinal change acquires power to induce institutional 
changes because most people including those in the interface between public perception and 
political decision-making concur on the need for change.  In other words, the ‘mental 
constructs’ of the institutional reality of most individuals converge on the issue of initiating 
change.  In this sense, there is a clear conceptual link between the role of ‘collective attitude’ 
and the role of the ‘subjective model’ or ‘mental construct’ of individuals underlined by 
North (1990).  From another perspective, perceptional convergence also implies the 
articulation or solidification of the demand for institutional change.  What is more relevant 
from the viewpoint of institutional change is the fact that the presence of such perceptional 
convergence and the emergence of the demand for institutional change provide incentives 
for the political entrepreneurs to lobby or take initiatives for institutional change.2 
                                                 
1 North (1990a: 43) cites voting and lifetime tenure for judges as instance for formal institutions that lower 
the cost of acting on one’s own conviction. 
2 The issue of whether such initiatives—considered as pubic goods—will be taken by the political 
entrepreneurs depends not on any ex-post benefit-cost analysis but on their ex-ante perception of a 
tangible political benefit to themselves or to their political parties (Knight and Sened, 1995a: 12).    
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3. CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTIONAL CONVERGENCE 
The basic issue is whether there can be perceptional convergence in the face of factors 
creating divergence such as ideology, bias, and information gaps, including sheer ignorance.  
The rationality postulate assumes that the actors posses cognitive capacity to see the true 
models of the world about which they make choices or, at least, they receive enough 
information to correct their initial models.  Unfortunately, when the information being 
received is incomplete or subject to multiple interpretations, the subjective models of 
individuals are bound to diverge (North, 1990: 17).  But, there are also factors that tend to 
minimize perceptional divergence.  These factors include both the cultural influences as well 
as the persuasive powers of the state or other moral authorities that reduce transaction costs 
and motivate people for collective action (Bates, 1994).  The prospects for perceptional 
convergence are also enhanced by the powerful effects of information flow and mutual 
learning.  Although the subjective perceptions of actors are culturally derived, they, however, 
undergo continuous modifications through experience, interaction, information, and 
learning.  The lower the cost of information and learning, the faster will be the alterations in 
subjective perceptions (North, 1990: 138).3 
  Since subjective perception of the actors is also not independent of objective 
influences, perceptional convergence is also induced by objective factors such as price, 
technology, and resource endowments.  In fact, the perceptional influences of the subjective 
and objective factors are often too mingled to enable a clear distinction and separation.  As 
such, it is not clear how the conventional transaction cost theory can account for the direct 
effects of subjective factors or the extent they capture the effects of objective factors.   
Subjective factors are also affected by institutions themselves through what can be called as 
‘legitimacy effect’ or the tendency to ‘go with majority’.  As institutions reinforce their own 
moral legitimacy, i.e., that which endures is often seen—rightly or wrongly—as morally just 
(Hodgson, 1998: 179).  Thus, the institutions that are being adopted by more countries or 
contexts tend to gain legitimacy and so do those that are found or projected repeatedly as the 
                                                 
3 Notice that perceptional convergence, in turn, has critical effects both on the overall cost of as well as on 
the ultimate gains from institutional transactions.  The magnitude of this effect, however, depends on 
the extent that changes in subjective perception leads to actual changes in attitudes and behaviors.  
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best form in various national and international fora.  These considerations including the role 
of international and inter-personal interaction and knowledge flow tend to play an important 
role in creating convergence in the subjective perception of institutions by individuals.  It is 
because of such perceptional convergence, we often observe certain amount of regularity 
and pattern in the institutional evaluation by individuals with diverse background. 
  The general tendency for convergence in institutional choice and valuation does not, 
however, negate the potential for divergence.  Such divergence emerges from the practical 
experience with poorly performing best institutions (due to contextual and implementation 
snags) as well as from the ideological moorings of individuals.  Knight and Sened (1995b) 
allude to the slippage in socially shared knowledge over the rules as one of the explanation 
for the violation of even self-enforcing institutions.  Such slippage comes from “lack of 
knowledge of these rules on the parts of members of the community, or from the 
differences in [the interpretations of] the substantive content of the rules” (Knight and 
Sened, 1995b: 11).4 
  Finally, it is important to understand the nature of the relationship between 
convergence in social expectation and convergence in the choice of institutions and their 
configurations.  While Knight and Sened (1995b: 12-13) recognized the major role that 
convergence in social expectation plays in the process of institutional change, they consider 
that the former is no guarantee for ensuring institutional convergence because of path 
dependency constraints.  We contest this view as it considers social expectation to be 
independent of prevailing institutions.  When subjective perception or social expectation is 
influenced by existing institutions, then, it will obviously be over only those alternative paths 
that are permitted by the current state of present institutions.  As a result, perceptional 
convergence can indeed lead to convergence in institutional choice as well.  
                                                 
4 From the perspective of our study what this means is the fact that the divergent tendencies of the 
subjective models of individuals ensures that the consideration of subject perception as an empirical 
basis for institutional evaluation need not lead to self-fulfilling prophecies or ignore genuine 
differences in perception or expectation.  
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4. PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A STAGE-BASED PERSPECTIVE 
The central role that subjective perception of individuals plays in the process of institutional 
change can be understood better by viewing the change process within a stage-based 
perspective.  In this perspective, the following four stages are crucial: (a) mind change, i.e., 
the changing perception of stakeholders and decision-makers both at the micro and macro 
levels, (b) political articulation and programmatic translation of perceptional change, (c) 
practical implementation of reform program that begins first with symbolic and procedural 
changes and, then, continues with real and substantive changes, and (d) ultimate impact of 
institutional changes.  These stages progress not as a linear process but as a circular process 
subject to constant subjective and objective feedbacks and adaptations. 
  As a result, the circular process is influenced both by subjective factors (e.g., 
ideology, bias, and ignorance) as well as by objective factors (e.g., relative prices, 
technological change, and other economic and physical factors).  Notably, the process is also 
affected by the significant intervening roles of other factors operating both at the macro and 
individual levels.  These factors include the political lobbying and bargaining, information 
flow and learning externalities, and behavioral changes and performance expectations.  More 
importantly, the circular process of change is not free from the influence of existing 
institutions partly due to their technical features such as path dependency and partly due to 
their effects on the worldview of main actors.  Our conceptualization of the stage-based 



























Subjective Theory of Institutional Change 
  Despite a fair amount of simplification, Figure 1 does highlight the central role that 
perception change plays both in initiating institutional change as well as in evaluating its 
behavioral and performance impacts.  Of the four stages in the process of institutional 
change, the first stage involving mind change assumes a critical significance.  The mind 
change of individuals signifies a change in their mental construct of the world and it gathers 
power when there is a critical mass of perceptional convergence as to the need, extent, and 
direction of institutional changes.  In addition to the subjective and objective factors noted 
above, mind change is also affected both by the behavioral and performance impacts of the 
existing institutions as well as by the nature and direction of the ongoing process of 
institutional change itself.  In this respect, the total benefit and its individual shares expected 
from institutional changes can also play a powerful role in influencing the mental construct 
of desirable institutions.  As long as the expectation of a majority of individuals is not 
fulfilled by the ongoing institutional changes, the circular process shown in Figure 1 will 
continue to create new and additional demand for institutional reform.  While underlining 
the positive role of information and learning on the process of mind change, we also need to  
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recognize the deleterious effects of the purposive and biased campaign by powerful interest 
groups to alter or distort general perception and hence, the demand for institutional reform 
and change.  
  As a consequence of mind change, the thinking and language of those who can 
influence institutional change undergo gradual change creating an economic and political 
environment propitious for institutional reform.  This characterizes the interface between 
the first and second stages where there is a strong perceptional convergence on the need for 
and nature of institutional change.  Since such perceptional convergence also gets crystallized 
into the economic and political spheres, there is an articulated demand for institutional 
change motivating political entrepreneurs to initiate and lobby for institutional reforms on 
the desired lines.  As economic incentives motivate economic organizations to convert 
perceptional convergence into political demand, political incentives also motivate political 
organizations to convert this political demand into concrete policy actions. 
  Although the economic and political organizations can agree on the need for change, 
they usually disagree on the details of change because they cater to different social groups 
each with divergent perspectives and expectations on institutional change.  Therefore, the 
reform program that would emerge at the end of the political process is an outcome of the 
relative bargaining strength of the political and other interest groups.  The relative bargaining 
strengths of these groups change not only with the changing resource realities and 
national/international economic environment but also during the process of adjustments 
within the reform program itself.  We also note that the reform package is subject not only 
to the political bargaining process but also to the technical constraints that delimit feasible 
paths of change (path dependency).  Thus, the final reform program reflects political 
compromises and technical adjustments.5 
  There is also considerable scope for slippage between reform implementation and 
actual change in existing institutions, especially in a democratic system.  In many contexts, 
                                                 
5 Notice that the technical adjustments required to account for path dependency constraints need not occur 
only at the stage of reform design.  It can occur even during the stages of both mind change and its 
political articulation as the processes at these stages are also influenced by existing institutions.  Thus, 
for instance, when the existing institutions characterize a democratic system, there cannot be any 
perceptional convergence or political lobbying for dictatorial institutions.  
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the initial changes following a reform program are mostly ceremonial and procedural in 
nature (e.g., policy declaration, legislation enactment, and renaming or merging of 
organizations).  It is also possible that these ceremonial changes and the false impression that 
the substantive changes will eventually follow can be sufficient to keep the demand for 
reform dormant for sometime.  This is likely the case when the institutional changes 
contemplated by the original reform program are against the interest of the economically and 
politically powerful groups.  Therefore, the perceptional convergence and political consensus 
for reform program have to be both powerful and enduring to take the reform process to its 
next stage where substantive changes in institutions will be implemented.  In some cases, the 
procedural changes can also have a facilitative role both in realigning political groups and in 
creating a pro-reform atmosphere.  Given a strong pro-reform climate with pressing 
economic compulsion and increasing political commitment for reform, institutional change 
gradually moves from the stage of procedural changes to the stage of substantive changes 
(e.g., legal reform, policy changes, and organizational restructuring).  If the predominant 
thinking is against any reform, business-as-usual trend continues and there will not be any 
institutional changes—either procedural or substantive. 
5. INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH AND ADAPTIVE EVALUATION 
Even with substantive changes in institutions, its impact on economic performance is not 
immediate but has a very long gestation period.  The direct outcome of institutional change 
is actually a process of behavioral changes and their ultimate outcome depends on the extent 
that these behavioral changes improve actual production and exchange.6  The material 
outcome of the process is, therefore, not immediate but takes a long time, often going far 
beyond the program period, to manifest in terms of observable and measurable benefits.  In 
the interim period, the performance impacts of institutional change can be measured in other 
                                                 
6 An instance from the water sector can clarify this point.  Unlike the case of water resource development 
projects where the outcome is the extent of resource created and its use in meeting irrigation and other 
water needs, in the case of programs aiming to reform water institutions, the outcome is a process of 
change.  As such, the ultimate effect of institutional reform programs depends on the ability of the 
process in sustaining itself and producing the ultimate effects of improving economic performance 
through better resource allocation, use, and management.  
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forms such as the extent the policy decisions in the new setting conform to the policy intent 
(Tool, 1977; Bromley, 1985). 
  The ‘instrumental value’ approach to institutional performance, though considered as 
the ‘ultimate problem-solving criterion’, is not free from difficulties and problems in 
practical situations (Livingston, 1987: 287).  For, there is neither any objective means for 
evaluating the consistency between decisions and goals nor any way for ensuring that such 
consistency actually leads to the realization of goals without knowing the process of 
implementation.7  As such, the application of instrumental value approach for institutional 
evaluation necessarily involves subjective judgment (Livingston, 1993: 816).  With the 
inevitability of subjective aspects, the instruments or reference points used in instrumental 
valuation can vary across individuals and would also include non-economic considerations as 
well.  
  Another major problem in evaluating institutional change through instrumental 
approach is the substantial difference between intended outcome and actual outcome due to 
the limited capabilities of individuals and the complexity of the problem at hand (North, 
1997: 8).  One important way that individuals overcome these human limitations is a 
constant process of adaptation of their subjective evaluation of both the action (institutional 
change) and outcome (performance impact) with information available at each point in 
time.8  In this way, both performance evaluation and adjustments of decisions are possible 
without having to wait for the observation of actual outcome that would occur after a long 
time gap.  As such, subjective evaluation is inevitable even during the third and fourth stages, 
where the actual institutional reforms, behavioral changes, and performance impacts are 
occurring.  The subjective feedbacks are occurring not only at the end of the third stage in 
                                                 
7 For instance, although water rights can be legally obtained for instream and environmental purposes in 
Colorado, in reality, there are only few instream water rights because the issuing power for such 
water rights is with the Colorado Water Conservation Board with a traditional orientation to irrigation 
and municipal water supply.  Under this condition, the acquisition of rights by private environmental 
groups rather than by a public agency may serve well the policy intent (Livingston, 1987: 293). 
8 The process of ‘mental accounting’ in which people organize the outcomes of transactions and evaluate 
them relative to a ‘reference point’ (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1984: 341) can be identified as the 
mechanism that is being used by individuals for adjusting their subjective evaluation.  The reference 
point can be either their instrumental values or the outcomes at status quo position, or both.  
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which the institutional changes are initiated but also during the fourth stage in which the 
economic impacts of these changes are beginning to take shape.  While perceived behavioral 
changes can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of institutional changes, the perceived gap 
between expected performance and actual performance could be used to evaluate the 
magnitude of the impact of institutional changes.  These subjective evaluations constantly 
feed into the process of mind change along with the objective factors and learning 
experience and get internalized within the circular process of institutional change. 
6. METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Although the subjective theory is deceptively simple and descriptive, it is able to bring 
together and synthesize several theoretical traditions within institutional economics.  The 
subjective theory, as described above, though underlines the central role of individuals as the 
agents of change, does recognizes the role of economic and political organizations as well as 
the political economy process through which the reform program is designed and 
implemented.  While the focus on individuals gives an impression that our theory is rooted 
in methodological individualism, the recognition of the role of economic and political 
organizations allows it to account for the influence of broader social and group interests.  
Besides, the subjective theory uses individuals and their perception not as an end in 
themselves but only as a means for endogenizing the participatory process through which 
perceptional convergence and consensus formation emerge among key players, including 
stakeholders and decision-makers.  Moreover, the role of interest groups and political entities 
is also implicit both during the course of perceptional change as well as during the process of 
political bargaining through which the final reform program emerges out.  As such, the 
subjective theory outlined above has a focus far beyond the role of individuals and their 
subjective perception. 
  While the role of information and learning is incorporated explicitly, that of the 
economic and political transaction costs is incorporated implicitly.  To the extent that 
perception change is influenced by the expected benefits and costs (including their individual 
shares) of existing and alternative institutions, the role of transaction costs—both economic 
and non-economic—are implicit in the subjective theory of institutional change.  With an  
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extension of the same logic, the role that political transaction costs play both during and 
after the second stage of political articulation and reform formulation has also been 
incorporated into the process of institutional change.  As such, the transaction costs—both 
economic and political—remain a key force both in the cognitive and observed phases of the 
process of institutional change.  Similarly, the role of political economy aspects such as the 
political entrepreneurs, interest group politics, and political bargaining are also explicitly 
incorporated within the subjective theory.  Since we consider that the subjective process of 
evaluation is based on the instrumental valuation of the players, the theory is obviously free 
from the normative aspects associated with conventional efficiency analysis. 
  While subjective perception is important throughout the process of institutional 
change, its role in the first stage, involving mind change is rather critical.  For, it is in the first 
stage that the effects of individual-specific subjective aspects, objective conditions, 
information flow and learning process, and subjective or instrumental feedbacks of both the 
processes of institutional change and its performance impact tend to converge and being 
captured.9  It is precisely the reason why we consider that a careful evaluation of the first 
stage of institutional change is instructive in understanding important issues such as the 
following ones.  How the institution-performance interaction is perceived?  What are the 
casual linkages implied in the perception of such interaction?  What are the dominant 
preferences over various institutional configurations?  These issues can provide key insights 
on the prevailing perception, evolving expectation, and emerging consensus on institutional 
linkages, performance, and change.  Unfortunately, the attention on the insightful first stage 
and the pervasive role of subjective perception continues to be a missing element in the 
literature.  In this study, in contrast, these two aspects, in fact, form the central part of both 
the evaluation methodology and its empirical application. 
                                                 
9 In the context of policy reforms initiated by donor and lending agencies such as the World Bank, White 
(1990: 10-12) considers the perception and understanding of the reform package by the country 
officials as the most important prerequisite for its effective implementation.  This observation is 
equally valid in the context of institutional change as it indicates the potential for the subsequent stage 





Bates, Robert H., 1994, “Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Essay on the New 
Individualism”, unpublished manuscript. 
Bhaskar, Roy, 1979, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary 
Human Sciences, Brighton: Harvester. 
Bromley, D.W., 1985, “Resources and Economic Development”, Journal of Economic Issues, 
19(September): 779-96. 
Bromley, D.W., 1989, “Institutional Change and Economic Efficiency,” Journal of Economic 
Issues, 23(3): 735-759. 
Commons, J.R., 1934, Institutional Economics, Macmillan, New York. 
Douglas, Mary, 1986, How Institutions Think?, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 1998, “The Approach of Institutional Economics”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 36(1): 166-192. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1984, “Choices, Values, and Frames”, American 
Psychologist, 39(4): 341-350. 
Knight, Jack and Itai Sened, eds., 1995a, Explaining Social Institutions, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Knight, Jack and Itai Sened, 1995b, “Introduction” in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., 
(1995a), pp. 1-14. 
Livingston, Marie Leigh, 1987, “Evaluating the Performance of Environmental Policy: 
Contribution of Neoclassical, Public Choice, and Institutional Models”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 21(1): 281-93. 
Livingston, Marie Leigh, 1993, “Normative and Positive Aspects of Institutional Economics: 
The Implications for Water Policy”, Water Resources Research, 29(4): 815-821. 
North, Douglass C., 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C., 1997, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding 
of the Transition Problem, WIDER Annual Lectures 1, World Institute for Development 
Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland. 
Tool, M. R., 1977, “A Social Value Theory in Neo-institutional Economics”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 11(December): 823-849.  
 
13
Veblen, Thorstein B., 1919, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and other Essays, Huebsch, 
New York. 
White, Louise G., 1990, Implementing Policy Reforms in LDCs: A Strategy for Designing and Effecting 
Change, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 